The inevitable triumph of physics

The recent history of energy policy has been dominated by short-term fixes. But the laws of physics remain stubbornly unmoved by the market-led solutions we have created. Simon Harrison, of the Energy Geeks thinktank, argues that the fix we need is already sitting on the shelf – all that’s missing is the decision to act.

The time for sticking plasters is over. Our markets and regulation are designed around a physical system that no longer exists, and the UK is being unusually exposed as a result. Electrons are not economists. They follow the laws of physics, and the rules need to follow it too. Economics still has a critical job to do, optimising within the limits that physics sets.

Arthur Downing’s new book Power and the People: A History of British Energy, tells the story of how our electricity and gas systems came to be. It shows that we’ve handled technical novelty, rapid scale-ups and epochal change before, much of it in a very different industry model, led by the physics and by what was then cutting-edge tech. The private sector bore much of the innovation and investment risk in the early days, followed by a long period of public sector control when engineer-led delivery drove massive expansions, achieved faster than the Chinese deliver in their country today. Once that had been largely achieved, the public bodies became bloated and inefficient, defects addressed by the Thatcher government in its 1989 privatisation. After that, commercial drive and the scope for economic efficiency drove a period of asset sweating, with engineering subsumed by the pursuit of cost reduction for commercial gain, arguing this was in the public interest.

It worked. Because the public sector had over-built there was plenty of room to sweat assets, and relaxation of rules on the use of gas for electricity generation brought forward a large wave of new power station investment. The laws of physics still applied – of course – but they were rarely tested, and commercial creativity found new solutions to some problems engineers would have looked at more expensively. Occasionally the physics might catch people out – for example in Malaysia when the response of new combined cycle plant to falling frequency seems to have been behind a blackout – but in Great Britain at least we were able to navigate these technical changes safely.


Simon Harrison is the group head of strategy at Mott MacDonald, deputy president of the IET and a member of the Energy Geeks. The Energy Geeks are a thinktank partnering with Utility Week on key issues of energy policy. Its members comprise: Eric Brown; Maxine Frerk; Simon Harrison; Roger Hey; Laura Sandys; Steven Steer; Alan Whitehead


Simon Harrison is the group head of strategy at Mott MacDonald, deputy president of the IET and a member of the Energy Geeks thinktank. The Energy Geeks are a thinktank partnering with Utility Week on key issues of energy policy. Its members comprise: Eric Brown; Maxine Frerk; Simon Harrison; Roger Hey; Laura Sandys; Steven Steer; Alan Whitehead

The time for sticking plasters is over. Our markets and regulation are designed around a physical system that no longer exists, and the UK is being unusually exposed as a result. Electrons are not economists. They follow the laws of physics, and the rules need to follow it too. Economics still has a critical job to do, optimising within the limits that physics sets.

Arthur Downing’s new book Power and the People: A History of British Energy, tells the story of how our electricity and gas systems came to be. It shows that we’ve handled technical novelty, rapid scale-ups and epochal change before, much of it in a very different industry model, led by the physics and by what was then cutting-edge tech. The private sector bore much of the innovation and investment risk in the early days, followed by a long period of public sector control when engineer-led delivery drove massive expansions, achieved faster than the Chinese deliver in their country today. Once that had been largely achieved, the public bodies became bloated and inefficient, defects addressed by the Thatcher government in its 1989 privatisation. After that, commercial drive and the scope for economic efficiency drove a period of asset sweating, with engineering subsumed by the pursuit of cost reduction for commercial gain, arguing this was in the public interest.

It worked. Because the public sector had over-built there was plenty of room to sweat assets, and relaxation of rules on the use of gas for electricity generation brought forward a large wave of new power station investment. The laws of physics still applied – of course – but they were rarely tested, and commercial creativity found new solutions to some problems engineers would have looked at more expensively. Occasionally the physics might catch people out – for example in Malaysia when the response of new combined cycle plant to falling frequency seems to have been behind a blackout – but in Great Britain at least we were able to navigate these technical changes safely.

When it all started to go wrong was when we started to want the system to do very different things – renewables at scale, the rise and rise of distributed energy, battery storage at all scales, active demand, piecemeal digitalisation – and a pathway towards much greater electrification. Consumers – domestic, institutional, business, industry were not only the reason for the industry to exist but were also starting to frame and even dominate its engineering development. Innovations at the grid edge started to show the rest of the industry what change at consumer pace and scale looked like.

These shifts demanded root and branch re-thinking of how everything worked, with long-established industry silos and governance fragmenting responses that needed to be integrated. Physics was fighting back.

But instead of listening to it, we tackled these new challenges with the tools at the top of the toolbox – new markets, new commercial arrangements and incentives. For example inertia, voltage support and system strength being bought through markets as if they were commodities. Markets can help procure them, but they cannot define the technical performance needed. Engineering picked up the consequences as best it could.

Spain and Portugal lost their power systems within seconds in April 2025, with ENSO-E’s investigation pointing to failures in voltage control. The Institution of Engineering and Technology’s (IET) recent review of the incident for Ofgem gave only a qualified assurance that the same issues in GB would not have the same consequences. This summer’s heatwave has created stability problems both the National Energy System Operator (NESO) and Ofgem have had to explain. The physics keeps winning and the markets are sending us the bill.

At the other end of the system: heat pumps. Britain’s Heat Pump Shitshow, by Mars Mlodzinski, unpacks in detail the mess we’re in with trying to roll out what is an excellent technology. A case study by itself in how a piecemeal approach without effective engineering input has resulted in a mess that’s left a core contributor to affordable, resilient clean energy not achieving pace and scale, created quite the opposite outcomes to those desired for many of those who took the plunge, and helped set the energy industry out as the political battleground it has become.

One could write a similar book about smart meters, but that’s another story.

A few false dawns

Back in 2010 I was involved in seminal work done by the IET, leading to a report Handling a Shock to the System that drew attention to this shift and argued for a much stronger architectural role within the electricity system. It was well received across the spectrum of interests and led to government-commissioned work from the IET and the Energy Systems Catapult – the Future Power Systems Architecture Project – that thought through the consequences for system functionality and governance.

Sadly though, the root and branch changes it laid bare as necessary were not tackled. They probably needed more political momentum than energy had at the time.

Later on, I was asked by the government to chair an independent review of engineering standards in electricity. This made recommendations about how such standards could be reframed to enable a consumer-centric decarbonised system, if delivered alongside broader reforms to markets and regulation. Again, I suspect this was too complicated for its time. All this work remains available online, and has ongoing relevance.

Progress was made in that as the formation of what is now NESO got underway, driven mostly by a political driver for independence in system operation, it was given a role in whole system planning. However, outside of system operation, much of NESO’s remit is advisory and its mandate and powers are unclear. NESO has taken on a host of challenging system design and implementation problems set by government, but has not yet fully embraced consumers as active parts of the system at a strategic level, key to its performance, resilience and governance.

So, fast forward to 2026, and we continue to layer in new governance complexities to try to tweak the system to do what we want. The Ukraine war and Strait of Hormuz energy crises have reminded us that energy remains a geopolitical tool, to the cost of every UK consumer and UK taxpayer, and have laid bare the high structural costs of energy in this country, masked for decades by cheap gas. Every layer of market, regulatory and commercial complexity carries a cost, presents a node of inflexibility, and carries a vested interest in its propagation into the future, and our system’s governance is now a cat’s cradle of overlapping such layers. The unbundling that led us to this point was intended to drive efficiency, but how much of this value remains given all the changes over time, and the costs (in every sense) of these arrangements.

As an engineer, all I see are interfaces. Some interfaces can be good – they introduce clarity of responsibilities and can drive efficiency in delivery. However, interfaces carry costs and need to be managed. That requires smart people and smart organisations, all of whom need their costs covered and often to earn some profit. Interfaces tend to result in allocation of risk, rather than its sharing to a common purpose, meaning commercial interests differ across them. Interfaces also get badly in the way of the kind of holistic systems thinking and systems engineering necessary to find solutions to the complex challenges now being posed by the physics, which respects no boundaries humans – or AI agents - impose.

There is an argument that digitalisation and AI will make interfaces cheap enough not to matter, and they should certainly help where every party exchanges data on common standards – that should be pushed forward. But a cheaper interface is still an interface, a place where returns are earned, accountability blurs, a cyber attack can get in. Even in a digitalised world we need fewer interfaces, with those that remain better defined.

What’s clear to me is that we have far too many interfaces and too much commercial complexity to allow us to handle where physics is now taking us. And our response to the challenges this throws us is currently to create more complexity. And every piece of complexity we have or add goes either onto the bill or into taxation.

The way forward

We are now overdue a full review, asking deep questions as to what we are seeking to achieve, where uncertainties lie and how they should be handled. The opportunities in digitalisation and the responsible use of AI should be at the core, as should the threat landscape we now find ourselves in. Then not being afraid to take the bold actions necessary to drive change such that we find the right path forward through the 2030s and beyond. The change needed will be at least as great as the 1989 privatisation, I believe. It is critical that this review takes full account of the physics, as ignoring it will make things worse not better.

None of this is a reason to wait on other pressing priorities to drive resilience up and costs down. Some fixes need no wholesale reform at all. The Engineering Standards Review recommendations government has already paid for include things you could start tomorrow.

Voltage is a ready example with local networks running hotter than they need to, wasting energy and limiting how much solar and EV charging can be connected. The standards and incentives to make this happen could be included in the next price control, without waiting for anything else. Eric Brown’s latest Utility Week piece explores this further.

This government has shown itself to be bold about energy, a welcome change from recent previous administrations. Clean Power 2030 has created a forcing function for change, including a whole industry commitment to new pace and scale. Its approach was to turn all controls to max under the current governance, to get things moving, and that has been achieved. The next stage needs to be the wholescale reform necessary to unlock affordability, resilience and decarbonisation in the 2030s and beyond. Starting that is already overdue.

So, what is the ask? A review of system architecture, run from inside the Department for Energy Security and Net Zero with a time limited mandate of say 18 months, an independent panel of engineers, economists and consumer voices challenging it as it goes. Its starting point would be the Future Power Systems Architecture Project and the Engineering Standards Review.It’s end point would be clarity of an architect’s role, and a named body given the powers to execute effectively.

We know how to do better. Much of the work is on the shelf, what is missing is the decision to act. I will be seeking, currently as deputy president of the IET, to make this case and drive action over the coming couple of years. Please join me in this journey.

Simon is one of the speakers at Utility Week Forum on 25-26 November. Standard tickets are now sold out but there are still a few places left for utilities. Register your interest here.